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MAXIMIZING SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMATIC RISK IN
THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY
ABSTRACT

Investors describe the uncertainty of a business’s success or failure as risk, and managers
must monitor this risk because it affects a companies’ cost of capital, market value and
ultimately shareholder wealth. Using regression analysis, this study reexamined how the
systematic (market related) risk of a company’s common stock is linked to corporate behavior
and financial performance. The results suggest that properly investing excess cash flow in
operating assets and high asset turnover may lower systematic risk and, depending on a
company's stage of development, director turnover may increase systematic risk.
Key Words: systematic risk, restaurant industry, operating leverage, financial leverage
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INTRODUCTION

The significance of beta to a firm’s value has resulted in researchers investigating the
relationship between beta and a firm’s financial variables for various industries (see Table 1) and
for restaurant companies in particular (Borde, 1998; Gu & Kim, 2002; Shin & Kim, 2007). Large
or small, restaurants are risky businesses with many forms of operating and financial risks
impacting their ability to stay in business. Among the risks are: changes in consumer tastes and
discretionary spending patterns; changes in general economic conditions; public safety
conditions or concerns such as outbreak of mad cow disease or the SARS epidemic;
demographic trends; the cost of food products, labor and energy; competition; and governmental
regulations.
These risks put investments in restaurants at considerable risk, resulting in many business
failures, despite the fact that the restaurant industry is booming. According to Angelo and
Vladimir (1998), 50% of new restaurants went into bankruptcy after one year, and 85% of them
went into bankruptcy after three years. Sales in the restaurant industry were $42.8 billion in
1970, increased to $185.1 billion in 1986, to $308.2 billion in 1996. In 2006 sales reached $537
billion marking the fifteenth consecutive year of real sales growth for the industry (National
Restaurant Association, 2007). Sales are expected to reach $565 billion in 2007 and represent 4%
of the U.S. gross domestic product. One important reason for this steady growth is people tend to
eat out more as their incomes increase and their personal time becomes a valued commodity
(National Restaurant Association, 2007).
Therefore, managing risk requires a focused and dedicated management team that
understands the determinants or causes of uncertainty. This would enable them to implement
policies and strategies that would help reduce risk, and thereby maximize firm value and
shareholders wealth (Brenner & Smidt, 1978).
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Risk and Return
Total risk of a security can be partitioned into two parts: nondiversifiable risk and
diversifiable risk. Diversifiable risk, or unsystematic risk, represents the risk associated with
random events (such as strikes, regulatory actions) that can be eliminated through diversification
of investments. Nondiversifiable risk, or systematic risk, is the shareholder-specific risk closely
tied to market factors (such as economic, political, and social events) that can not be eliminate
through diversification. Therefore, systematic risk is a stock's volatility due to the market's
volatility; or the covariance with the overall market’s movement. Systematic risk is donated as β
(or beta) (Goetzmann, 2006).
The concept that investment return should increase as risk increases is a basic tenant of
financial management. To maximize a company’s share price, management must learn to assess
two key determinants: risk and return. Each financial or operational decision presents certain risk
and return characteristics, and the varying combinations of these factors has an impact on share
price. Risk, or the chance of financial loss, significantly affects a business’ investment
opportunities and the wealth of its owners, while return is the total gain or loss experienced on an
investment over a given period of time.
The basic theory that relates risk and return for all investors is the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM). The CAPM links systematic risk (beta) and stock return and determines the expected return a
potential investor requires on an investment (Fama, 1976). The higher the systematic risk, the
more an investor expects. The formula used to describe the CAPM relationship is:
Ke = Rf + β (Rm – Rf)
Where
Ke = investor’s required rate of return
Rf = risk-free interest rate
β = beta coefficient
Rm = return on the market portfolio
(Rm – Rf) = market risk premium

(1)
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The Beta Coefficient
Systematic risk, or the beta coefficient, is a market sensitivity index; it measures the
volatility of a given stock relative to the market (e.g. the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock
Composite Index). This tendency of an individual stock to move with the market constitutes risk,
because the market fluctuates, and these oscillations cannot be diversified away (Huo & Kwansa,
1994).
Some stocks have virtually no systematic risk. These stocks are not influenced as much
by the general market, but rather company specific factors; for example, the food service
industry has a low beta and is relatively isolated from market ups and downs. Other stocks, such
as high technology companies, have high betas and their stock returns are strongly influenced by
the general market. As indicated market related risk results from factors that systematically affect
all firms, such as recession, inflation, and high interest rates (Hartviksen, 2004).
Deriving Beta from Return Data
Beta is derived by regressing a stock’s historical returns on overall market returns. The
quantified slope of the linear regression is generally positive. A steep slope indicates greater
volatility to market variations, while a shallow slope indicates less exposure to the market. For
example, a stock with a beta of 2.0 will be twice as responsive to the market as a stock with a
beta of 1.0.
Company Characteristics and Restaurant Risk
Financial distress, potential insolvency and reduced shareholder wealth are the ultimate
results of mismanaged risk, and studies have identified factors that may help managers and
investors predict a company’s financial troubles, leading to a better understanding of the
company’s risk. Weston and Brigham (1990) proposed that both asset structure (operating leverage) and
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financial structure (financial leverage) are factors that affect a firm's systematic risk (beta). Generally
hospitality firms are fixed-asset intensive and highly-leveraged (Huo & Kwansa, 1994).
Operating leverage is the percentage of fixed costs in a company’s cost structure.
Generally, the higher the operating leverage (higher fixed costs than variable costs), the more a
company's income is affected by fluctuation in sales volume (Huo & Kwansa, 1994). For
example, a restaurant company with higher operating leverage will generate greater operating
income in times of sharply increasing sales than will a company with a lower operating leverage
(higher variable costs). Conversely, a restaurant company with lower operating leverage will
perform better when sales revenue decreases. The more significant the volume of sales, the more
beneficial the investment in fixed costs becomes, which means the company does not have to pay
as much additional money for each unit produced or sold. However, the down side to this high
operating leverage is if a high percentage of a firm’s costs are fixed, they do not decline as
demand decreases, this can increase the company’s business risk (Huo & Kwansa, 1994).
Financial leverage is the additional variability in earnings due to the use of debt. The
greater the degree of financial leverage, the greater the fluctuations (positive or negative) in
earnings per share. The common stockholder therefore, is required to endure greater variations in
returns when the firm's management chooses to use more financial leverage rather then less (Huo
& Kwansa, 1994).
In identifying the determinants of systematic risk or beta, previous studies have examined
the relationship between beta and liquidity, debt leverage, operating efficiency, profitability
dividend payout, firm size, sector analysis and growth using multiple regressions with beta as the
dependant variable (see Table 1).
•

In the hotel industry, seven variables were examined as important factors of systematic
risk: leverage, growth, firm size, liquidity, efficiency, profitability, and dividend payout
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ratio. Leverage ratio and growth were positively related to systematic risk, while firm
size had a negative relationship with systematic risk. Correlations between the other
variables and systematic risk were not found (Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002).
•

Current ratio, leverage ratio, assets turnover ratio, and profit margin ratio were
investigated as potential determinants of systematic risk in 35 U.S casinos. Only asset
turnover was negatively related to a firms’ systematic risk; no relationship was found
with any of the other variables (Gu & Kim, 1998).

•

Systemic risk (beta) was compared with liquidity, dividend payout ratio, leverage, return
on assets, and growth opportunities for 55 companies in the restaurant industry (Borde,
1998). The levels of liquidity and growth opportunity were found to be positively related
to systematic risk while dividend payout ratio and return on assets were negatively
related. Leverage ratio was almost irrelevant with risk, which was not expected as
leverage is generally believed to be related positively with risk (Borde, 1998).

•

A study of 72 restaurant firms using liquidity, dividend payout ratio, leverage, return on
assets, and growth opportunities found systematic risk had a negative relationship with
assets turnover but had a positive relationship with liquidity (Gu & Kim, 2002).

•

Shin and Kim (2007) investigated systemic risk (beta) with liquidity, dividend payout
ratio, leverage, return on assets (profitability), and growth opportunities in the restaurant
industry. They concluded liquidity, return on assets, and growth opportunities were
related to a firm’s systematic risk (beta). Dividend payout and leverage were not
statistically significant and therefore unsuitable factors in explaining beta.

Although their research did not relate to systematic risk, Barber, Ghiselli, Deale and
Whitham (2007) studied the relationship between company financial performances on CEO
turnover in the restaurant industry. They concluded that negative stock and accounting
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returns can be a good predictor of turnover. The assumption was that a board of directors
would act (relatively) quickly to avoid the risk of further financial or market deterioration
due to poor executive and company performance.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
A number of these studies have examined the relationship of certain financial
determinants and beta, using different time periods and number of restaurants. This current
research is to follow the studies performed by Borde (1998), Gu and Kim (2002) and Shin and
Kim (2007) on restaurant firms’ systematic risk (beta) determinants. There are various reasons
that support this study’s reexamination of restaurant beta determinants.
First, according to the study by Brode (1998) the 52 restaurant companies used had a
mean annual growth in EBIT of 5.1% percent during the period 1992 - 1995, while in the study
by Gu and Kim (2002), which used 75 restaurant firms, had a mean negative annual growth in
EBIT of 18.7% from 1996 - 1999. In the study by Shin and Kim (2007), they sampled 42
restaurant companies and reported a mean annual growth of EBIT that was a negative 42.7%
during the period 2001 – 2005. In contrast, the 64 restaurant companies in this study reported a
mean annual growth in EBIT of 4.1% during the period 2000 – 2005. The fact that all three of
the previous studies examined different time periods and had different sample sizes could be one
of the main reasons in explaining the differences and warrants further analysis.
Second, the restaurant industry has continued to undergo restructuring since 1995.
According to Gu and Kim (2002), 40% of the restaurant firms tested by Borde (1998) were nonexistent by their study in 1999, due to either bankruptcy or mergers. This current study contained
an updated sample and only included 14 (or 27%) of the original restaurant companies used by
Borde (1998). Finally, Borde (1998), Gu and Kim (2002) nor Shin and Kim (2007) considered
the possible effect of executive manager turnover on systematic risk.
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As a result of their findings on beta determinants, this study used only the 4 ratios found
by Borde (1998), Gu and Kim (2002) and Shin and Kim (2007) as identifying factors that affect
systematic risk in restaurant companies. In addition four new variables – return on equity (ROE),
interest coverage, earnings before income tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) as a
percentage of revenue and Executive Management and Director Turnover were used in this
study. No previous studies were found that tested these new variables.
These new variables were chosen for the following reasons. First, return on equity has not
been previously used to model the potential impact on risk, yet return on equity plays an
important role between return and risk (Arditti, 1967; Bromiley, 1991). Bromiley (1991)
concluded that low performance results in a company's income stream becoming more risky and
thereby lowers future performance.
Second, it has been suggested that interest coverage has an impact on the amount of risk a
company may take (Bromiley, 1991), which in turns influences the markets perception of the
company’s market risk. Again, Bromiley (1991) proposed that wasted or unused resources “slack” could result in potential low performance, and suggested two measures. The first is the
debt-to-equity ratio, which reflects a lack of potential slack, and the second is the interest
coverage ratio, calculated as the ratio of income before taxes and interest charges to interest
charges, which indicates the presence of potential slack. Firms with additional resources can take
advantage of opportunities and have more strategic options available than firms without
additional resources. For example, a corporation with larger income relative to interest charges is
in a better position to take on additional debt to grow and expand the company than a corporation
with lower income relative to interest charges.
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Third, EBITDA is commonly used as a key measure of financial health, particularly by
lenders to determine debt service capabilities. In a study conducted by Baker and Ruback (1999)
it was found to provide the most precise estimate of value depending upon the industry.
Finally, there were no studies found that considered Executive Management and Director
Turnover and the impact on risk (beta). However, in a study by Barber et al. (2007), they
determined that a change in executive leadership is a significant event in the life of a company
and that financial performance impacts CEO turnover in restaurant companies.
As discussed earlier, financial distress, potential insolvency and reduced shareholder
wealth are the ultimate results of mismanaged risk, and studies have identified factors that may
help managers and investors predict a company’s financial troubles, leading to a better
understanding of the company’s risk. Therefore, this study has selected key executive turnover as
a possible determinant of risk (beta) because of the instability turnover can cause in the market
and resulting perception of financial risk.
METHODOLOGY
To examine how the market related risk of a company’s common stock is linked to
corporate behavior and financial performance this study used data for the six years beginning
2000 through 2005. The companies included were derived from the March 4, 2006 Nations
Restaurant News Stock Index of 73 publicly-traded U.S. restaurant and other food service related
companies (“NRN Companies”). Using proxy statements (DEF 14A) filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, data on the composition of boards of directors and executive
management were gathered. Company financial determinants were collected from the Mergentonline database and beta from Value Line Research. Value Line beta is calculated by regressing
the weekly changes in the price of the stock against weekly percentage changes in the NYSE
over a 5 year period; no adjustments are made for dividends in this calculation.
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The variables used in the beta determinant model were selected according to whether
they measured profitability (ROE or ROA), liquidity (Quick Ratio), debt management (debt to
assets, leverage, and interest coverage) and asset management (asset turnover). To increase the
explanatory power of the beta determinant model, the four new variables discussed earlier were
used. The first variable was return on equity which was calculated using net income divided by
the average stockholders equity for the period.
The second variable, interest coverage, is a calculation of a company's ability to meet its
interest payments on outstanding debt. Interest coverage is equal to earnings before interest and
taxes for a time period, divided by interest expenses for the same time period. The lower the
interest coverage, the larger a company’s debt burden and the greater the financial risk to
investors. The Third variable was change (or turnover) in Executive Management and Boards of
Directors. Executive Management and refers to those in a position to influence the strategic,
operational and financial decisions of a company and included the following individuals:
Chairman/CEO, CEO, COO/President and CFO (“Executive Management”). The final variable
was Earnings Before Income Tax, Depreciation and Amortization as a percentage of revenue for
a given period.
Turnover was determined by tracking Executive Management for each of the NRN
Companies during the sample period and computing a simple percentage change. For example,
turnover across top 5 officers of a firm was measured by comparing the Executive Management
of the firm across year’s t and t-1. If an officer appears in t on the DEF 14A but never appears
again in the DEF 14A as an employee of the firm, we assume that the officer has quit and we
hence code turnover as 1/5 or 0.2.
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Data Analysis
After reviewing the data, a number of companies were removed from the sample because
of U.S. bankruptcy filings and/or because they issued stock under an initial public offering and
complete public information was not available. There were no mergers or acquisitions during this
sample period that would have impacted this analysis. As a result, data were available for 64
companies (average) during the sample period (“NRN Sample Companies”).
Testing of the NRN Companies life cycle and size followed the method used by Barber et
al. (2007), which grouped the companies according to gross revenue (using quartiles as the
grouping points). For example, group one companies had the lowest gross revenue, and the 25%
quartile separated it from Group 2, the next largest, etc. This was done in order to examine the
relationship between turnover and company size.
This follows in part the research of Hanks, Watson, Jansen, & Chandler (1993) in which
companies can be clustered according to annual sales, growth rate and organizational structure.
Although their research did not address public companies, it is commonly accepted that once
public, the expectations of investors, lenders and the market in general may create new growth
and organizational demands for company Directors, Executive Management and other key
employees – which undoubtedly affects turnover. Support for using gross revenue as a surrogate
for company size was assessed via correlation; the relationship between gross revenue and
market capitalization for all NRN Companies was highly significant, r = .9425 (p<.0001).
The data were analyzed using statistical procedures including descriptive statistics,
correlation analysis, and regression (SAS release 9.1 TS level 02M0), similar to the studies by
Borde (1998), Gu and Kim (2002) and Shin and Kim (2007). The descriptive analysis focused on
variable means. Beta was a dependent variable, while liquidity, leverage, ROA, ROE, EBITDA
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of revenues, interest coverage, asset turnover and executive management and director turnover
were the independent variables.
The study's methodology examined the relationship between beta, the market-derived
measure of risk described above, and various company-specific financial characteristics using
regression analysis. A common problem associated with regression using cross-sectional or time
series data is that the regression model may be impacted by heteroscedasticity, which violates the
constant residual variance assumption of regression. This can be avoided by using the weighted
least-squares (WLS) regression procedure, as suggested by Kleinbaum, Kupper, and Muller
(1988) and Borde (1998). The weights are the reciprocals of the absolute values of the residuals
from a first-path ordinary least-squares regression. Using this method, the OLS regression model
shown below is estimated first.
RISK(beta) = α0 + α1 Liqi + α 2 Levi + α 3 ROAi + α 4ROE + α5 EBITDA%i + α 6 Intcovi + α7Astrn + α8Turn + U

Where:
α0 = intercept
Liq = liquidity, defined as the average ratio of cash plus short-term securities to total
assets for firm j over the study period.
Lev = leverage, defined as the average ratio of common equity to total assets for
firm j over the study period.
ROE = represents Earnings from Continuing Operations divided by average Total
Equity and is expressed as a percentage.
ROA = operating returns, defined as the average ratio of net income to total assets
for firm j over the study period.
EBITDA% = Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization
divided by total revenues.
Intcov = calculated by dividing a company's earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT) of one period by the company's interest expenses of the same period:
Astrn = take the total revenue and divide it by the average assets for the period
studied.
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Turn = Turnover was determined by tracking Executive Management for each of
the NRN Companies during the sample period and computing a simple percentage
change.
After the OLS regression model was determined, two WLS models were derived. The first
model included all eight independent variables to establish the initial assessment and role of each
variable in the model. The second model followed the forward selection regression method as
proposed by Stevens (1986). This was done to refine the model so only significant variables were
remaining.
The forward selection procedure considers the first variable to enter the model as the one
with the largest correlation with the dependant variable. If the variable is statistically significant,
then the second variable with the largest semi partial correlation with the dependent variable is
considered. If the second variable is significant, then a third variable with the next largest semi
partial correlation is considered until all independent variables are considered. At some stage, a given
variable will not make a significant contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable and the
procedure is terminated. This study followed the cutoff significance value used by Borde (1998) and Gu
and Kim (2002) of 0.05
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the NRN Companies. The mean systematic risk
(beta) for all NRN Companies is 1.20 with a range of -0.20 to 3.06. Group four had the highest
mean beta (1.5) and group one the lowest mean beta (0.89).
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Correlations among the variables are presented in Table 3. Return on assets has the
highest negative correlation with beta, while interest coverage has the highest positive
correlation. High positive inter-predictor variable correlations were also found between EBITDA
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and ROA (0.64, p<.0001), ROE (0.32, p=.0099), as well as between asset turnover and ROE
(0.26, p=.0419) liquidity (-0.28, p=.0287) and EBITDA (-0.35, p=.0059). Therefore,
multicollinearity among independent variables was checked for in the regression model.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The WLS regression model results are presented in Table 4. Asset turnover is the
dominant determinant of restaurant beta as indicated by its highest statistical significance level
(t-value=-1.74, p<.01). The direction of the asset turnover beta (-0.282) is consistent with
previous studies (Gu & Kim, 1998; Logue & Merville, 1972), suggesting that by efficiently
managing assets, turning assets over quickly can lead to a lower restaurant beta. The other
significant variable in the model is liquidity (t-value=-1.92, p<0.01). The direction of liquidity is
negative, confirming the relationship found by Logue & Merville (1972) and Moyer & Chartfield
(1983) that a higher ratio can indicate less risk. Although the variables, executive turnover and
directors turnover are not significant at the 0.05 level in the model, their positive direction was
expected. The greater the turnover rates among these two groups, the greater the impact on a
company’s stock price, and ultimately beta.
To check for the presence of multicollinearity variance inflation factors (VIF) were
determined. Variance inflation factors below 10 generally indicate multicollinearity is not a
major concern (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1989). Similarly, VIF greater than 4 is an
arbitrary, yet common cut-off criterion for deciding when a given independent variable displays
high multicollinearity (Mertler & Vannatta, 2002). Table 4 presents the VIF with no variable
above 10 and only one variable, Director Turnover was close to 4.0 (3.98); therefore it appears
that multicollinearity may not be a problem.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
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Table 5 presents the results of the forward selection WLS regression model for the NRN
companies and by the company’s stage of development. The NRN companies’ stage of
development followed the method used by Barber et al. (2007), which grouped the companies
according to gross revenue (using quartiles as the grouping points). The variance influence factor
(VIF) values are well below the cutoff of 10, with two variables just under the VIF of 4.0 as
suggested by (Mertler & Vannatta, 2002), indicating that there is no serious concern about
multicollinearity issues in this regression model (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1989).
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
For the sample of NRN companies, liquidity (β=-0.152) and asset turnover (β=-0.179)
were the only significant variables to enter the model, with asset turnover the most significant. In
the smaller companies (groups one and two), director turnover significantly affected beta. This
suggests that the relationship between turnover and beta may be related to factors associated with
firm size and/or life cycle. In other words, director turnover has affected the systematic risk of
smaller restaurant firms than larger firms.
Despite the need to grow these companies in size beyond their geographic niche,
shareholders and stock markets are not tolerant of poor accounting and market returns,
particularly when these smaller companies may be more dependent on the right leadership. This
supports previous studies where logistic regression found a relationship between turnover and
poor market and accounting returns (Barber, et al., 2007; Conyon & Florou, 2002).
In the largest companies (group four), ROA was the significant predictor of beta. These
companies have large and usually diverse asset mix. Managing and operationalizing these assets
to generate the highest returns may result in these companies facing a smaller probability of
failure and therefore helps lower risk.
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CONCLUSION
This study reexamined determinants of systematic risk (beta) of 64 restaurant firms from 2000
through 2005. Using the WLS regression analysis, restaurant firms' systematic risk correlated
negatively with assets turnover and negatively with liquidity. The findings suggest that efficient use of
existing restaurant assets is the key to risk reduction and firm value enhancement. The results of this
study confirm Borde's (1998) and Shin and Kim (2007) regarding liquidity and Gu and Kim (2002)
regarding asset turnover.
These results indicate that if a firm has the ability to meet short-term financial obligations, this
could lower risk. Given the goal of restaurant firm executives is to maximize the wealth of their
shareholders; they may take consider these findings when formulating corporate strategies. If
restaurant firms can not avoid retaining too much cash and near-cash assets in excess of their
short-term liabilities and investing this excess in efficient operating assets, they should consider
distributing this excess to shareholders as dividends (Borde, 1998; Gu & Kim, 1998).
Managing for value is not a mysterious process. However, it does require a long-term
focus on returns, not quarter to quarter changes in earnings per share. The “value manager”
perspective is characterized by the ability and willingness to act on opportunities to create
incremental value, while recognizing that each new investment project earning an appropriate
return above the company’s opportunity cost of capital should be accepted. Focusing on
shareholder value is not a one-time task to be done only when outside pressures emerge.
As discussed earlier, Barber et al. (2007) determined that turnover of Executive
Management and Directors impacted a company’s financial performance. This study disclosed
an interesting finding relating to turnover and beta. Turnover of directors was a significant
predictor of beta, suggesting that the relationship between turnover and beta may be related to
factors associated with firm size and/or life cycle. This was the case for smaller companies
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within groups one and two. Directors at these stages of growth and development are critical
“strategists” in steering a company through the hazards of the initial stages of “post-listing”
market share development and brand identification. Until the companies mature and gain market
share, with resulting efficiencies gained in operations with greater net income, perceived risk by
the market may be expected. Therefore, high director turnover at the early growth stage may
signal poor financial performance for the company, thereby impacting the market perception of
the company’s financial health and its resulting beta.
As mentioned earlier, the different sample sizes and different time periods may be the
reason that this study differed from the other studies exploring risk in the restaurant industry. The
restaurant industry is ever changing and dynamic, with new restaurants opening and many older
ones either closing or merging with competitors.
In summary, the results of this study confirm the need to manage financial ratios. The
linkage between financial variables and beta ultimately impacts shareholder wealth and the
viability of the company. This study confirmed the results of other research that liquidity, ROA
and asset turnover are significant predictors of beta (Borde, 1998; Logue & Merville, 1972;
Moyer & Chartville, 1983 and Gu & Kim, 1998). It also demonstrated that beta can be impacted
differently by each of these predictors, depending on the company’s stage of growth (life cycle).
The other seemingly important variables, interest coverage, ROE, leverage and EBITDA were
not important predictors of beta.
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Table 1. Summarized Results of Previous Research
Financial Determinants
Relationship to Beta

Researchers
Jensen (1984)

Positive

Negative
Liquidity

Logue & Merville
(1972); Moyer &
Chartfield (1983)
Borde (1998)

Positive
Not significant either way

Gu & Kim (1998)

Positive

Gu & Kim (2002)

Negative

Shin & Kim (2007)

Debt Leverage

Positive

ROA

Negative

Kim, Gu & Mattila
(2002); Borde,
Chambliss & Madura
(1994);Gu & Kim
(2002)
Borde (1998); Logue
& Merville (1972)

Negative

Shin & Kim (2007)

Operating Efficiency
(asset turnover)

Negative

Logue & Merville
(1972);Gu & Kim
(2002)

Dividend Payout

Negative

Borde (1998); Logue
& Merville (1972)

Not significant either way

Gu & Kim (2002);
Shin & Kim (2007
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Proposed Reason(s)
High liquidity increases cost
of free cash flow and raise risk
of wasteful use of cash assets.
High liquidity, suggests low
short-term debt.
Valuable resources are not
being invested in high-earning
operating assets.
Available resources not
invested in operating assets
(lost opportunities).
If a firm has ability to meet
short-term financial
obligations, this could lower
risk.
Debt financing creates
financial risk. Using less debt
can reduce systematic risk.
Ability to manage property
profitably.
Ability to manage property
profitably.
High efficiency in using
revenues to generate revenues
helps lower risk.
Returns from dividend
perceived by investors as more
certain than through higher
stock price
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Six Years 2000 to 2005
Mean

Std.
NRN
NRN
Companies
Companies
One (n=16)
Two (n=16)
Three (n=16) Four (n=16)
Variable
(n=64)
(n=64)
Beta
0.89
1.1
1.1
1.5
1.2
0.7
ROA
-3.5
2.1
6.8
3.1
2.0
12.9
ROE
11.6
0.4
11.3
12.2
9.0
31.9
Liquidity
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.4
0.7
0.6
Leverage
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
EBITDA/Revenue
4.1%
7.0%
15.2%
13.5%
9.8%
7.3%
Asset Turnover
1.9
1.5
1.4
1.5
1.6
0.5
Interest Coverage
-4.5
3.9
31.2
11.7
9.9
651.1
Executive Turnover
5.4%
5.0%
2.0%
5.3%
4.4%
0.1
Director Turnover
2.8%
2.0%
1.8%
2.5%
2.3%
0.1
Note: ROA = return on assets; ROE=return on investment; EBITDA=percentage of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization over revenue.
Group

Group
One
Two
Three
Four

Minimum beta
-0.20
0.13
0.39
0.80

Maximum beta
2.28
3.06
2.85
2.96
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Table 3. Pearson Correlations Between Variables (n=64)
(n=64)
Beta
ROA
ROE
Liquidity
Leverage
EBITDA
Asset Turnover
Interest Coverage
Executive Turnover
Director Turnover

Beta

ROA

ROE

1.00
-0.17
-0.13
-0.04
0.06
-0.01
-0.12
0.10
-0.003
-0.03

1.00
0.57*
-0.06
-0.11
0.64*
0.04
0.12
0.04
-0.07

1.00
0.01
0.13
0.32*
0.26**
0.03
-0.03
0.13

* Significant at p=.01. ** Significant at p=.05.

Liquidity Leverage

1.00
-0.07
-0.09
-0.28*
0.11
-0.01
-0.01

1.00
-0.01
-0.03
-0.08
-0.09
0.22

EBITDA

1.00
-0.35*
0.10
0.01
-0.11

Asset
Turnover

Interest
Coverage

Executive
Turnover

Director
Turnover

1.00
0.11
0.10
0.32

1.00
-0.08
0.05

1.00
0.29

1.00
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Table 4. WLS Regression Model With all Variables
(n=64)
Coefficient
t-statistic
VIF
Intercept
1.936
3.17**
NA
ROA
-0.003
-0.20
ROE
0.0002
0.03
3.44
Liquidity
-0.278
-1.92*
3.19
Leverage
0.595
1.18
1.23
EBITDA
-0.009
-0.41
2.49
Asset Turnover
-0.282
-1.74**
2.14
Interest Coverage
0.0003
1.91*
1.10
Executive Turnover
0.062
0.18
1.43
Director Turnover
1.545
0.51
3.98
**=Significant at 0.01 level; *=Significant at 0.05 level. R2=0.2683, Model F=3.30
(Significant at 0.05 level)
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Table 5. Forward Selection WLS Regression Model for NRN Sample and by Proposed Life Stage
Coefficient
t-statistic
VIF
NRN Sample (n=64)
Intercept
1.707
11.62*
NA
Liquidity
-0.152
-2.03**
1.04
Asset Turnover
-0.17986
-2.97*
1.04
Group One (n=16)
Intercept
1.313
8.50*
NA
Director Turnover
14.886
5.05*
3.78
Group Two (n=16)
Intercept
6.040
13.27*
NA
ROA
-0.086
-7.47*
1.00
Asset Turnover
-2.877
-9.26*
2.68
Director Turnover
9.593
5.42*
3.43
Group Three (n=16)
Intercept
2.470
28.16*
NA
Asset Turnover
-0.7931
-12.39*
1.01
Executive Turnover
7.895
19.59*
2.74
Group Four (n=16)
Intercept
2.369
15.74*
NA
ROA
-0.0960
-6.46*
1.00
*=Significant at the 0.01 level. R2 = 0.4018, Model F-statistic=6.49 (significant at the 0.01 level). Group
one R2 = 0.9074. Group two R2 = 0.9954. Group three R2 = 0.9959. Group four R2 = 0.8741.

